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Laboratizing the border: The 
production, translation and 
anticipation of security  
technologies
Mike Bourne, Heather Johnson and Debbie Lisle
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
Abstract
This article critically interrogates how borders are produced by scientists, engineers and security experts 
in advance of the deployment of technical devices they develop. We trace how sovereign decisions are 
enacted as assemblages in the antecedent register of device development through the everyday decisions of 
scientists and engineers in the laboratory, the security experts they engage, and the material components 
of the device itself. Drawing on in-depth interviews, observations, and ethnographic research of the EU-
funded Handhold project, we explore how assumptions about the way security technologies will and should 
perform at the border shape the development of a portable, integrated device to detect CBRNE threats 
at borders. In disaggregating the moments of sovereign decision-making across multiple sites and times, 
we question the supposed linearity of how science comes out of and feeds back into the world of border 
security. An interrogation of competing assumptions and understandings of security threats and needs, of 
competing logics of innovation and pragmatism, of the demands of differentiated temporalities in detection 
and identification, and of the presumed capacities, behaviours, and needs of phantasmic competitors and 
end-users reveals a complex, circulating and co-constitutive process of device development that laboratises 
the border itself.
Keywords
Borders, laboratories, security, technology, translation
Introduction
The Handhold project began in 2011 in response to a European Union (EU) FP7 funding call 
that sought the development of a portable and integrated CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives) detection device that would complement, if not replace, 
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the use of sniffer dogs at EU borders. Intended ‘for deployment by European customs agen-
cies, border guards, first responders, police, civil security or others operating in potentially 
hostile environments’ (Handhold, 2012), the objective was to develop a prototype device – a 
portable box about the size of a car battery – that could operate with greater efficiency at a 
lower cost than dogs, and in environments or areas where dogs are impractical. Handhold 
brings together scientists, engineers and ‘end-users’ from nine institutions in five EU member 
states who, in their everyday laboratory practices, enrol their software and sensors, their hard-
ware platforms, and one another into a coherent enactment of a future border. In doing so, they 
and the device they develop blur the lines between the supposedly separate spheres of science 
(expertise and experimentation in the laboratory) and security (sovereign decision-making at 
the border).
During 2013 and 2014 we observed the scientists and engineers of the Handhold project. We 
saw scientists and engineers perform many of the discretionary decisions that ultimately constitute 
the sovereign decision to permit or exclude at the border. Prior to the use of the Handhold device 
by border guards to examine flows of packages, containers, and people, we discovered that the 
capacities to detect, identify, control, and manage – the capacities which enable the enactment and 
practice of sovereign decisions of inclusion/exclusion – are constituted in the daily practices of 
scientists and engineers in their laboratories and on their computers. As we witnessed the develop-
ment, negotiation, and adaptation of the Handhold device we also witnessed the composition of 
European borders.
Building upon critical scholars who illustrate the radical redistribution of the border and the 
manifestation of sovereign decisions in unexpected places (e.g. on boats, in public spaces, in 
drones), this article shows how sovereign decisions are enacted – indeed, are lively and numerous 
– in the scientific and technological imaginaries that develop border devices prior to their deploy-
ment (Balibar, 2004; Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2012; Rumford, 2012; Salter, 2012). In con-
tributing to a research agenda that understands border security as the variegated everyday ‘practices 
of the plurality of power-brokers involved in the securing of borders’ (Côte-Boucher et al., 2014: 
195; Jasanoff, 2006), we show how scientists and engineers are significant power-brokers in this 
process, and how device development is one of the most important of the ‘plural forces of authori-
zation’ that enable sovereign decisions at the border (Amoore, 2013: 14–15; Connolly, 2005). As 
Côte-Boucher et al. explain:
Research into concrete, everyday practices allows for a reconceptualization of security as a set of 
mediated processes situated at the junction between, on the one hand, the actions and worldviews of 
diverse border security actors and, on the other, security discourses, strategies, policies and technologies. 
(2014: 199)
By engaging in theoretically informed ethnographic research of the development of one security 
device (Handhold), we redirect critical insights from scholars who are politicizing the materiality 
of security technology at the border site to the antecedent register – to the laboratories that con-
struct such devices (Aas, 2005; Adey, 2004; Amoore 2013; Amoore et al., 2008; Muller, 2010; 
Squire, 2014; Vaughan-Williams, 2009).
Engineer:  Roughly speaking, the plan is designed to deliver a prototype … I pretty much saw some-
thing close to a prototype this summer.
Interviewer: The blue boxes?
Engineer: Yes … the blue boxes. (Handhold, 2014a)
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This exchange with a Handhold engineer encapsulates the puzzle at the heart of this article: What 
is contained in these blue boxes that are meant to increase the security of sovereign borders? Who 
are they for? What, exactly, do they do? In this article we question the supposed linearity of the 
enrolment technological devices into security practice. Rather than seeing security devices as 
being first a product of science and then a tool of security in which ‘science’ decisions in the labo-
ratory are supplanted by political ‘sovereign’ decisions at the border, our analysis of Handhold 
reveals that anticipations and assumptions about bordering practice simultaneously constitute both 
the border and its moments of sovereign decision, and also the device development process itself 
in tangible and productive ways.
In the looping back of assumptions about how devices will perform ‘in the field’ into processes 
of technology development, we find that the sovereign decisions of bordering are made not only by 
border guards (using devices) at the moment of border crossing, but also that they are disaggre-
gated across time and space such that the multiple decisions made by scientists and engineers in 
their laboratories are also (and necessarily) constitutive of the ‘sovereign decision’ of the border. 
The linear sequence is thus disrupted as the scientific process is revealed to be multi-dimensional 
and co-constitutive with the practices of security.
Therefore, in conjunction with asking what Handhold’s ‘blue boxes’ do when implemented at 
the border, we must also analyse the complex story of how that blue box came to be, revealing 
decisive moments within the development process. How the devices were constructed, what forces 
shaped their composition, and which assumptions shaped how scientific and technical decisions 
were made become significant questions.
Analysing security through device development reveals the complex and contingent spati-
otemporal emergence of political agency: in this case the political act of producing sovereign 
borders. We conceive the developing Handhold device as both an assemblage in its own right 
and as a possible future component of wider assemblages and practices of bordering. This arti-
cle explores how bordering action emerges in the mediations of scientists, end-users, materials, 
international standards and policies, laboratory practices, immaterial imaginations, and phan-
tasmic figures (terrorists, smugglers, border guards) as they circulate and combine with wider 
forces of political economy (from government funding to imperatives for fast and accurate 
bordering decisions). In the provisional stabilization of these forces and their co-functioning, 
these diverse entities create a device that enacts security in the laboratory while also reconfig-
uring the physical border site through practices of laboratization (i.e. the deployment of labo-
ratories in the world).
Science and security: Sovereignty, assemblage, 
translation, and laboratization
Engineer:   They’re up to every dodge and fiddle, and remember, the criminals and the terrorists have 
some very clever chemists, strategists, and technologists who they pay a lot of money or 
bribe or exert influence – [slaps hand] that sort of influence – to get things their way. 
(Handhold, 2013a)
This framing of enemies as clever, cunning and ruthless is central to the security apparatus cur-
rently dominating the contemporary world order. Indeed, critical scholars in IR have done excel-
lent work demonstrating how the prior framing of enemy Others – as threatening, cunning, and 
merciless – is central to the ways in which sovereign borders are currently understood and per-
formed (Amoore, 2006; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Squire, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2009). The supposed 
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mobility and flexible geography of criminals and terrorists underlies the securitization of mobility 
per se and the related modalities of bordering responses (Bourne, 2011; Elden, 2009; Packer, 2006; 
Salter, 2013). As a European Commission consultation paper on detection technologies in law 
enforcement, customs, and security argued, in 2006:
The nature of the threat from terrorism and crime is … becoming increasingly mobile. Hence, security 
authorities require portable solutions. Such solutions can improve cost-effectiveness and be readily 
transferred from one location to another where they are most needed, as it is simply not feasible to cover 
every entry point or point of concern with the same level of security. (2006: 10)
In 2011, the Handhold consortium was formed to answer an EU call that responds to this demand 
for portable solutions. Within Handhold, prevailing assumptions about threats, dangers, and ene-
mies are always present, but are mostly unsaid – an ambivalence that powerfully shapes the emer-
gence of sovereign decisions in dedicated laboratories and scientific practices located far away 
from the frontlines of geopolitics. Because this device will be deployed – at least initially – at 
sovereign borders, it is constantly positioned against human and non-human threats (e.g. the ‘crim-
inals and terrorists’ who make CBRNE materials mobile). While engineers like the one quoted 
above occasionally refer explicitly to these threats, the meta-context of the device as a technology 
enabling the performance of sovereignty is largely assumed. But sovereign power is not silent in 
the project – far from it. Instead, sovereignty manifests itself in complex and heterogeneous ways 
throughout the device’s development, most obviously in the way that assumptions and anticipa-
tions about how border technologies will operate at the border govern the multiple trajectories, 
imaginaries, and possibilities that emerge in the laboratory.
Critical Border Studies shows that sovereign decisions of bordering practices (the decision to 
permit or exclude) are not exceptional acts of an ‘unencumbered sovereign’ (Côte-Boucher et al., 
2014: 199) or the force of a singular security rationality, but are constituted by discretionary judge-
ments performed by border guards (Salter, 2008). While we acknowledge Butler’s (2006: 65) 
claim that these ‘petty sovereigns’ deploy power in order to ‘reanimate’ sovereignty, we also know 
that bordering practices exceed anthropocentric framings because they also enrol non-humans, 
devices, practices, assumptions, and imaginations (Smith, 2009). Thus, discretionary sovereign 
decisions are assemblages that emerge from the interactions of border guards, procedures, detec-
tion devices, sniffer dogs, environmental conditions, screens and readings, suspicions, mobilities, 
imaginations, and experiences (Connolly, 2010: 179; Deleuze and Parnet, 2007). Moreover, these 
decisions occur continually and simultaneously at multiple sites and scales. Drawing upon recent 
conversations between security studies, STS, Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and Post-Humanism, 
we do not seek to simply ‘apply’ STS approaches to issues of border security studies; STS scholars 
continually caution against ‘application’ (Acuto and Curtis, 2013; Adey and Anderson, 2012; 
Aradau, 2010; Bellanova and González Fuster, 2013; Salter 2015a, 2015b; Walters, 2014). Rather, 
we engage the strange yet mundane topologies of the intersections between science and security 
that unsettle our familiar assumptions about both fields. We do not seek to merely identify fruitful 
correspondences or controversies between these two fields, but to engage the space that emerges 
by working between them.
Laboratories are assemblages of people, expertise, instruments, materials, routines, etc. They 
are constructed sites in which the work of controlling variables and reducing ‘noise’ is done in 
order to detect and identify entities’ actions and to act or enable others to act upon them. They 
are never merely the secluded spaces of the production of scientific knowledge, but rather are 
both the sites and the sets of productive forces that make the construction of reality possible 
(Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Our research shows that the distinction between device/artefact and 
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laboratory (site and forces) is a blurred one, better grasped as the productive stabilization of dif-
ferent sites and times, and different actants and forces, into a particular co-functioning. For 
Callon et al. ‘the laboratory is a machine for producing inscriptions, for making possible their 
discussion, interpretation, and mobilization’ (2001: 51). Laboratories transform ‘teeming, dis-
persed crowds into … traces that can be taken in at a glance’ (2001: 51). Here, laboratory actions 
closely resemble bordering actions to be performed by the Handhold device: transforming cha-
otic crowds into rapidly actionable traces and indicators that enable and shape future actions. 
Our argument is that the politics of bordering are distributed and constituted in the earlier trans-
formations of ‘crowds’ into traces, traces into inscriptions, and inscriptions into decisions. The 
development of a security device, then, is political, and contains multiple political actions. 
Rather than separate worlds of laboratory sites and border sites we find connections and flows, 
we find political forces active in the laboratory, bordering decisions enacted in the laboratory, 
and anticipations of laboratory actions at the border.
To draw out our claim that discretionary sovereign decisions include the antecedent register of 
laboratories of device development, we use Michel Callon’s (1986) concept of ‘translation’ that 
articulates how multiple things (goals, materials, devices, etc.) are brought into relation with one 
another, and how they are modified through this process (see also Freeman, 2009). One of the most 
useful schematics of translation is set out by Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe (2001) 
to analyse the political implications of an increasingly specialised and socio-technical world where 
the controversies of political life both entangle and redefine the boundary of the social and the 
technical. For them, the world does not divide neatly into separate technical and political issues; 
rather ‘[t]o declare an issue is technical is effectively to remove it from the influence of public 
debate; on the other hand, to recognize its social dimension restores its chance of being discussed 
in political arenas’ (Callon et al., 2001: 25).
Foregrounding this social dimension means understanding that laboratory work does not exist in 
isolation, but rather develops through ‘ceaseless movement … permanent exchanges between spe-
cialists and the world that surrounds them … the laboratory is only one element in a larger set-up, 
one stage in a long succession of comings and goings’ (Callon et al., 2001: 47–48). In theorizing 
these ‘comings and goings’ of science, Callon et al. (2001) present translation as an interconnected 
process with three distinct stages. These are understood as Translation 1, which represents the reduc-
tion of the macrocosm to the microcosm or, more simply put, reduces the real world to the lab, 
‘translating’ reality into simplified forms so that it can then be studied and manipulated. This manip-
ulation is Translation 2, as a group composed of human actors (scientists, technologists) and, cru-
cially, also their instruments and devices, explores these simplified objects, testing them in 
‘laboratory conditions’ to have real, if contained, effects. Translation 3 is the return of these objects 
to the ‘real world’ – but also the reconfiguration of the real world to reflect laboratory conditions and 
so to produce analogous effects to those experienced in the lab. Callon et al. (2001: 65) elaborate on 
this through their concept of ‘laboratisation’, which suggests that what is achieved in one enacted 
space (Translation 2) must be retained in its movement to another (Translation 3). For Callon et al. 
this is a rather unidirectional process of transformation: ‘For the world to behave as in the research 
laboratory… we simply have to transform the world so that at every strategic point a “replica” of the 
laboratory, the site where we can control the phenomena studied, is placed’ (2001: 65). Not only 
does this ensure a degree of stability of the assemblage as it moves/translates, it also ensures that the 
world ‘behave[s] as in the research laboratory’.
The concept of translation is useful in our analysis of Handhold in two ways: first, it effectively 
dissolves prevailing distinctions between the social and the technical; and second, it clearly reveals 
the terrain of the political (Callon, 1986; Callon et al., 2001; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour, 1987). 
Here, we echo Callon et al.’s (2001: 4) injunction: ‘Politics is the art of dealing with disagreements, 
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conflicts, and oppositions; why not bring them out, encourage them, and multiply them, for that is 
how unforeseen paths are opened up and possibilities increased.’ While these claims are seductive, 
our analysis of Handhold shows this model of ‘secluded research’ to be too linear, partly because 
it assumes that Translation 3 (from the laboratory back out into the ‘real’ world of political contro-
versies) is the most politically important stage in the process. This privileging of the final stage of 
translation emerges, in part, from the security clearances and highly expert knowledge required in 
the laboratory space of Translation 2, which render it seemingly closed to public engagement. This 
depoliticizing lack of transparency orients public debate and scrutiny towards Translation 3, when 
the technology is already at work ‘in the field.’ The result of this closure is a limited and incomplete 
understanding of the politics of security technology. While we acknowledge that the material bor-
der is the most obvious site at which the assemblage of sovereign decision making (especially the 
border guards’ discretion) is clarified, reduced, and embedded within technological devices, our 
research showed similar processes occurring much earlier in Handhold’s development. Not only do 
the first and second translations determine the conditions of possibility for Translation 3, but future 
projections of what will happen at Translation 3 are constantly (re)circulating and making demands 
during Translations 1 and 2, disrupting the linearity of the process. In the laboratization of the 
Handhold project, which ensures that the world of border guards, migrants, and moving things is 
modified and improved, the political world of the border must be anticipated and pre-emptively 
designed into the device. Here, the distinctiveness of Translations 1, 2, and 3 becomes blurred and 
the worlds of science and security emerge as co-constitutive and irreversibly entangled.
The concept of translation has been acknowledged by critical border studies scholars who argue, 
for example, that border guards ‘translate’ rather than simply ‘apply’ laws and policies; that is, they 
make discretionary decisions–they interpret, alter, and renegotiate given security parameters (Côte-
Boucher et al., 2014). We develop this further, enrolling the antecedent register of device develop-
ment itself: the lively and multiple negotiations at the site of the border are also shaped by earlier 
translations in the laboratory that transform threats, goals, and geopolitical forces into specific 
engineering tasks. Target substances are turned into numbers and graphs, and suspicious packages 
become digitized alerts on a screen, forms that are ‘translated’ at the border, certainly, but which 
are first shaped by specific, material, and translated decisions in the laboratory that set the condi-
tions of this border translation. By unpacking the heterogeneous operations of a technology as it is 
being developed rather than retrospectively as it is being used, we seek to redeploy the politiciza-
tion of borders (e.g. the public debates on privacy and surveillance; the everyday practices of 
border guards; the unjust renditions of the security apparatus) into the antecedent register of design, 
experimentation, and development. In short, we move backwards from the border into the labora-
tory, revealing multiple origin points for the political contestations that arise from the use of 
already-complete border security technologies.
Negotiating threats: Interpretation, pragmatism, and innovation
End User:   There are already radio and nuclear detectors out there that are very good. Handhold is 
not going to better that technology, so why bother? … There is no advantage to having 
one piece of kit to detect multiple things. We like dedicated equipment that will detect 
one thing. (Handhold, 2013b)
Critical scholars in IR have done excellent work showing how dominant approaches in the disci-
pline have always been underscored by the fantasy of total security in which sovereign borders can 
be finally and totally protected against designated threats (Dillon, 1996; Huysmans, 2006; Walker, 
1993). Such a fantasy can only be sustained by continual performances of sovereignty in sites such 
as borders where accurate decisions about who/what is included or excluded must be made over 
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and over again. While each of these sovereign decisions is supposed to be a clear demonstration of 
robust security, the mundane enactment of such decisions – especially when delegated to devices 
– always contains misfires, surprises, failures, and silences. As Amoore (2013: 107) explains, 
‘[t]he surface effect of locating technologically a mobile person or object contains a multitude of 
conversations, mistakes, assumptions, and whims on the part of other subjects and objects’. Like 
many scholars in Critical Border Studies, we are interested in the role technology has in enabling 
the fantasy of total security to flourish: how it furnishes those ideational dreams with certainty, 
accuracy, reliability, efficiency, and impartiality. At the heart of the bordering process, then, is an 
important structuring tension between the belief that technology can provide total security on the 
one hand, and the everyday practices of human/technological assemblages that are riven with com-
peting agendas, unexpected failures, tangents, and miscommunications, on the other.
This tension manifests itself in the development of Handhold in those moments where the pur-
pose of shoring up sovereign decisions with scientific certainty is belied by the mundane, everyday 
practices of scientists, researchers, and engineers in the laboratory. Our observations are that the 
development of Handhold is not a straightforward or even rational mobilization of techno-science 
in the service of sovereign power. Rather, what we have discovered is a series of decisions, direc-
tions, and collaborations that owe more to pragmatism, efficiency, ambition, and haphazard 
consensus-building than they do to an overarching goal of protecting borders from palpable threats. 
Our intention here is to prise open the articulation of sovereign decisions within the laboratory to 
show how the fantasy of total security is unworked even before its devices are deployed.
The aporia at the heart of this fantasy has its origins in Translation 1, when the political contro-
versy of borders – specifically the ability of European borders to halt the circulation of threatening 
substances – gathered enough momentum, resources, and publicity to demand the shift from the 
‘real world’ into the laboratory. With respect to Handhold, this was initiated by a large EU FP7 
grant which pre-determined the most dangerous substances (namely, CBRNE) and mobilized 
expertise within these parameters to produce a portable device to be used at European borders 
(Handhold, 2011; Handhold, 2013j).1 The EU’s clarity about the named threat of CBRNE fulfils 
the fantasy structure because it suggests a simple solution to the endemic problem of insecurity: if 
scientists and engineers simply develop the best means to detect these substances, and future 
funding concentrates on response and containment, then our borders will be safe.
What interests us in the circulations between Translation 1 to 2 are the negotiations around the 
bid call itself, which was described by one end-user as a ‘dog’s dinner’ (Handhold, 2013b). Amid 
the competing forces that constitute the specific laboratory actions of Handhold, discretionary 
judgements made by scientists and engineers reshaped the parameters of the bid call throughout the 
early stages of the project. For example, the central aims of the project were understood differently 
by project partners and end-users, and then were ignored, reimagined, transposed, and improvised 
during routine scientific experiments in the laboratory such that the final composition of the device 
is not precisely as described either by the call, or by the expectations of the Handhold scientists or 
end-users. It is instead emergent, a hybrid, translated device that is shaped through circulating 
relations, assumptions, and contestations throughout the development process.
Like all contemporary funded research, the Handhold project involves end-users at every stage. 
In this case, security agents, border guards, and customs agents work in collaboration with scien-
tists and engineers (both public and private) to bring this integrated device to its prototype stage, 
and to imagine a future for it in the commercial world. Collectively, Handhold participants navi-
gated a fundamental tension between the way that scientists and engineers interpreted the EU’s 
privileging of CBRNE threats, and the end-users’ very different conception of threat based more 
on routine criminality than catastrophic danger (i.e. the less dangerous substances that end-users 
actually see coming across their borders). For example, one end-user was more interested in having 
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Handhold detect for diesel, tobacco, and cash, whereas another was much more interested in using 
it to detect a particularly popular narcotic (Handhold, 2013b; Handhold, 2014b). Because none of 
these substances pose a direct and immediate threat to any nation in the way that uranium might, 
they were not privileged in the bid call, nor were they prioritized by the scientists and engineers 
building the sensors for the Handhold device. However, in negotiating these competing under-
standings of threat in the early part of project design, one engineer wondered whether Handhold 
could potentially become a more versatile device in which users could insert ‘cards’ with inbuilt 
sensors to detect anything they wanted (e.g. narcotics one day, chemical weapons the next) 
(Handhold, 2013f, 2014a). Moreover, such was the intensity of one end-user’s desire for a sensor 
to detect a specific narcotic substance that they repeatedly brought it up at consortia meetings until 
halfway through the project, even when it was clear that all the partners had reached a consensus 
over which particular materials the device would detect (Handhold, 2014d). While end-users tried 
to insert the daily practices and professional priorities of border guards into the laboratory space of 
Handhold, these did not amount to deterministic sovereign demands upon the scientists and engi-
neers. Rather, these claims were translated and renegotiated in technical meetings and collabora-
tive spaces in which other forces (e.g. routine engineering and scientific practices, institutional 
pressures, anticipated markets, particular expertise) also modified the process of technology devel-
opment. Nevertheless, while they were not actively constructing the device itself, the end-users 
were ‘built-in’ to its development: their routines and capacities were directly inscribed and pre-
scribed in the emerging device (Latour, 2008: 160). While they acted at a distance by bringing 
insights from the border itself (Translation 3) into laboratory space (Translation 2), their views 
were absolutely central to the imagination, construction, and adaptation of the material device 
itself. Collaborations between scientists, engineers, and end-users meant that the role of ‘petty 
sovereign’ enacting discretionary decisions at the border was mobilized in the laboratory as the 
device was being developed.
Decisions about what was actually to be detected by Handhold emerged in the routine daily 
practices and decisions of the scientists and engineers involved. They were seldom governed by the 
lofty goal of protecting the sovereign borders of Europe, but rather by a widespread and well-
understood discourse of pragmatism. All participants were well versed in the huge gaps between 
what the bid call required (i.e. effective, efficient, and portable detection of CBRNE substances) 
and what was scientifically possible. They inhabited that misalignment quite comfortably as they 
pursued their daily research, which was revealed as surprisingly random and idiosyncratic in 
nature. All Handhold partners worked professionally towards the stated aims of the project, but the 
route to this goal was shaped and transformed by the manner in which scientists and engineers traf-
ficked between their multiple scientific projects (while also mobilizing expertise and learning 
across projects), negotiated their career ambitions, and developed unexpected intellectual interests. 
Those working in publicly funded universities negotiated their commitment to Handhold with 
other research that was considered more pressing, more prestigious, and more intellectually chal-
lenging. Often, they spoke about Handhold as slightly tangential to their central focus; that is, they 
were perfectly capable of achieving the necessary science, but it was not enabling them to pursue 
their ‘real’ research interests, which were represented as more innovative (Handhold, 2013c). In 
some cases, this positioning of Handhold as rather ‘mundane science’ may account for the large 
number of Doctoral and Post-Doctoral researchers enrolled onto the project to manage its day-to-
day development, while the more senior figures are freed up to work on more innovative aspects 
of the device (or indeed, on other prestigious projects). Innovations in technique, method, and 
direction continue to be the primary driver for academic publishing plans. Conversely, partners 
working in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) framed their participation in Handhold primar-
ily through future commercialization plans. For these scientists and engineers, the project’s 
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purpose of protecting Europe’s borders from CBRNE is always handcuffed to the pressures and 
forces of the market for security technology, such as the overall cost, the size and workability of 
the device, competing products, and the potential profit margins.2
During the initial phase of development in which trial, error, experimentation, and testing were 
the norm, scientists and engineers were not overly constrained by their collective decision to focus 
on CBRNE materials but were driven instead by a very simple desire to produce something – a 
sensor, a programme, a prototype – that worked. With respect to developing sensors, this often 
involved ‘practising’ (testing, adapting, re-directing) with substances that behaved like CBRNE for 
the purposes of detection, but were not ‘the real thing.’ This practice is not surprising in itself; 
given the heavy restrictions placed on CBRNE substances, scientists and engineers routinely work 
on more available substances, such as ‘synthetic’ versions of banned narcotics, during research. 
Importantly, this trafficking between substances is not governed by the consensus that CBRNE are 
the most dangerous things crossing borders, but rather by much more pragmatic concerns about 
existing expertise, state regulations, health and safety procedures, ethical parameters, and cost. For 
example, one of the project partners has a wealth of expertise about the detection of various drugs 
and toxins; the team has a fully equipped laboratory that meets all health and safety regulations, as 
well as resident expertise and infrastructure to negotiate the regulatory context of acquiring illegal 
and dangerous substances for the purposes of research. While Handhold is certainly an opportunity 
to build on existing expertise, the scientists in this laboratory were more explicit about using the 
project as an opportunity to develop additional research skills in methods of detection, such as 
surface chemistry. In this sense they were less concerned about what their sensors detected, and 
more concerned with developing new methods of detection that would, in the future, expand their 
institutional research horizon (Handhold, 2013d).
Throughout all stages of Handhold’s development, we witnessed complex negotiations over 
how to interpret the bid itself and how to transpose some kind of interpretive consensus into work-
able science. These negotiations did not cease once funding was acquired, end-users were enrolled, 
and research had begun – quite the opposite. Rather, the same tensions kept emerging, for example 
between end-user desires and scientific preferences, which troubled the consensus reached between 
all project partners. What this suggests is that the ‘multitude of conversations, mistakes, assump-
tions, and whims’ that shape bordering practices are also operating in the antecedent register in 
ways that un-work the certainty of both scientific claims and sovereign decision-making (Amoore, 
2013: 107). It is neither the fantasy of total security nor the imagination of future deployment that 
centrally drives these conversations. Rather, it is a complex multi-directional contestation that 
enrols several subject positions, material substances, skill-sets, institutional pressures, governing 
forces, and career trajectories into micro-political decision-making about the device itself. These 
decisions are not contained within the ‘secluded research’ of Translation 2, but are instead infected 
by lingering dissatisfactions over the bid call itself, and are saturated with the multiple future 
imaginings of end-use, and end-users.
Assembling time, detection, and decision
Engineer:  The only way to kind of be sure was essentially to get on and to start trying it … doing 
experiments on the original device … ‘this is how long it’s going to take’… ‘that’s too 
long’
Interviewer: So, it is the time it takes to process that is the key?
Engineer:  Exactly … one of the first things is to draw up a list of requirements, and that involves a 
lot of contact with the end-users. And in there are things like how long you are prepared 
to wait to get a reading. It’s not exact but it gave us an idea that it needs to be sub-minute 
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for a sensor reading. I mean if bags are going past, for the sake of argument, and it tells 
you half an hour ago there was a bag went past that had something in it, that’s no use. 
(Handhold, 2013e)
Despite acknowledging the impossibility of total security and the surprises, detours, mistakes, and 
misfires that underscore contemporary bordering practices, technology remains privileged in pro-
posed solutions for a central reason: it is faster, more reliable, and more accurate than human 
practice. However, as Amoore (2013) argues, this reliance on technology for border security intro-
duces an important structuring tension between (a) the complex temporality of flows (of people, 
things, and ideas) across borders, and (b) the time needed for the technology to produce data and 
decisions in the name of security or revenue. Bordering action, then, is both a temporally emergent 
agency (Pickering 2005) and is also about making these numerous distinct temporalities compati-
ble. This desire to ‘make security quick’ involves what some Critical Border Studies scholars have 
described as practices which ‘concertina time’ (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2012: 730). We see 
this most clearly in the way that the instantaneous alerting produced by a portable detection tech-
nology (i.e. the milliseconds it takes to produce a particular sensor reading) is made to fit into a 
wider pre-emptive temporality of forewarning geared towards potentiality and probability.
Certainly border security demands instantaneous information from the technologies it enrols, 
and customs officials rely on technological devices to provide a rapidity that far exceeds human 
capacity. For example, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) understand certain security tech-
nologies as ‘force multipliers’ enabling them to ‘work smarter and faster in detecting contraband 
while expediting legitimate trade and travel’ (US CBP, 2013: 1). What our research of Handhold 
demonstrates is that the temporality of technologically enhanced detection – the precise moment 
that enables the sovereign decision of what is permitted to enter and what is not – is a heterogene-
ous and multi-layered event in which an ‘instant’ has multiple durations. This is not a single 
moment of decision enacted by humans working in concert with increasingly autonomous security 
technologies; rather, this is a prolonged and textured experience that is constituted by multiple, 
competing, and juxtaposed temporalities. In short, the apparently instantaneous moment of detec-
tion is actually an assemblage of multiple distributed moments of decision.
Two temporal goals arise in the call to which Handhold responds: fast (i.e. instantaneous) and 
parallel (i.e. simultaneous) detection and identification. It states that ‘the “mechanized dog” should 
be able to detect in parallel a variety of possible illicit elements, with reliability, high speed of 
detection and identification, allowing fast threat assessment’ (European Commission, 2010: 
24–25). While parallel or simultaneous detection is produced by the integration of multiple sensor 
components in the blue box, it is the goal of instantaneity that reveals most clearly the multiplicity 
of actions and decisions involved in producing fast detection. How fast is possible? How fast is fast 
enough? The answers to these questions are negotiated and renegotiated throughout the technologi-
cal development process in similar ways to the selection of substances and methods. The funding 
call merely demanded ‘high speed’ and ‘fast’ action, and various consultations with end-users 
reinforced the need for speed. Handhold scientists and engineers developed more specific under-
standings of both time and speed, which were formed and negotiated though the assembled rela-
tions with their equipment, substances, and each other.
In building a short and coherent time for detection, scientists and engineers enrol practices from 
multiple scales and sites. For example, a wide range of international standards for Radiation and 
Nuclear detection exist, including some specifically for handheld devices. On the Handhold pro-
ject, these standards informed but did not impose a target on researchers. Rather, scientists and 
engineers made a specific choice as to which of the numerous standards to adopt as a target, a 
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choice driven by the dynamics of possibility, innovation, and curiosity that we saw in the selection 
of substances. In this case, they selected the global IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) 
standards recently adopted by the EU rather than, for instance, US police standards. In other areas 
(e.g. Chemical, Biological and Explosives), target detection times did not draw on specific interna-
tional standards, but were negotiated between the Handhold partners themselves. In these cases, 
‘fast’ is a matter decided by, and negotiated between, scientists, engineers, and end-users with only 
implicit acknowledgement of international standards (Handhold, 2013g, 2014d).
The ways in which Handhold engineers construct the temporality of detection and bordering 
decisions is also an emergent effect negotiated with humans in congregation with materials. Each 
sensor technology brings its own temporality of detection to the device, and these multiple tempo-
ralities arise from the interaction of specific target substances (e.g. biomatter) with aligned detec-
tion devices (e.g. surface chemistry). The sensors in Handhold do not directly detect the target 
substance; rather, they detect and identify that substance on the basis of its action – the difference 
it makes to something else. In other words, the sensors measure and compare reactions to sub-
stances such as light or other chemicals (Handhold, 2013j, 2013k, 2014c, 2014d). These reactions 
have different temporalities. The reactions detected by radiation, nuclear, chemical, and explosive 
sensors, indicated by infrared and light technologies, produce detectable changes in micro-seconds 
(Handhold, 2013j). Biomatter, on the other hand, is stubbornly slow as it interacts with ‘biorecog-
nition elements’ (i.e. antibodies), which may take many minutes to produce a reaction (Handhold, 
2013j). Given these multiple reaction times, the Handhold team had to actively construct a ‘Total 
Detection Time’ out of the numerous temporalities generated (Handhold, 2013m, 2013d, 2014d, 
2013f, 2013l, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). These differences in reaction time, in turn, created new chal-
lenges for those working on how to display the results. For example, the team had to enrol and test 
recently developed processor chips to make sure they could manage data emerging at such differ-
ent speeds (Handhold, 2013e, 2013h, 2013i, 2013f, 2013l, 2014d). What we discovered in our 
observations of Handhold were complex and non-linear temporalities that were stitched together 
through negotiation across the entire collective as partners tried to balance the competing forces of 
international standards, common scientific practices, and the multiple substances, reactions, and 
calculations constituting the device.
This active construction of temporality engages what Pickering (1995: 20) refers to as the ‘tun-
ing’ practices of technology that always enrol human and material agencies into assemblages that 
modify even the most instrumental programmes (Latour, 1994, 1999). As Pickering (1995) sug-
gests, the slow, circuitous and heterogeneous development of instantaneous detection is itself a 
‘dance of agency’ in which the nature of decision is not that of sovereign/human intentionality nor 
non-human/technological determinism. Rather, there is a ‘dialectic of resistance and accommoda-
tion’ (1995: 22) in which the intentional actions of scientists and the agency of materials modulate 
and modify each other. It is precisely by opening up the moment of detection within the develop-
ment of Handhold that we are able to see more clearly the complex and emergent choreography 
between human actors and the material technologies they work with:
As active, intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new machine. They then adopt a passive 
role, monitoring the performance of the machine to see whatever capture of material agency it might 
effect. Symmetrically, this period of human passivity is the period in which material agency actively 
manifests itself. Does the machine perform as intended? Has an intended capture of agency been effected? 
Typically the answer is no, in which case the response is another reversal of roles: human agency is once 
more active in a revision of modelling vectors, followed by another bout of human passivity and material 
performance and so on. (Pickering, 1995: 21–22)
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For us, this ‘dance of agency’ is not simply the usual daily practice of laboratory science and tech-
nology development because the future border emerges within the laboratory and presents itself as 
another dance partner in the desire to compress detection time.
All of the tuning of detection time was governed in advance by the idea that border guards and 
customs agents require quick answers to their two primary questions – Is something present (detec-
tion)? If so, what is it (identification)?– in order to move more quickly into practices of dispersal, 
containment, and protection. However, the target time varied according to the specific bordering 
action required: practices of detection and identification themselves have different temporalities 
(detection in seconds, identification in minutes), and because each substance produces different 
durations of detection and identification, there are always multiple answers to the imagined ques-
tions of the border guard. For example, if neutron radiation is detected, the relative lack of ambigu-
ity and imminent danger will yield prompt action, whereas the detection of an unspecific ‘chemical’ 
or ‘biological’ substance is not itself a cause for alarm but instead requires a further step of identi-
fication to determine whether it is potentially harmful (e.g. ricin) or just illicit (e.g. cocaine) – a 
process that is seen as more complicated for biological and chemical substances than for radiation 
(Weerth, 2009). These different processing times must also be attuned to the specific flows being 
acted upon: for example, cargo containers spend long periods of time behind secure borders before 
they are cleared for movement, which provides more opportunities for access, testing, and analysis 
than the speedier trajectories of passenger baggage or postal deliveries.
In all three translations the notion of speed remained intact, but a consensus on speed (i.e. how 
fast is fast enough) was always emerging and changing as engineers, end-users, instruments, sub-
stances, atmospheres, and imaginations combined their initially incompatible temporalities. In 
revealing the multiple and complex temporalities at work in the elongated moment(s) of detection, 
decisions no longer appear as contained moments of human intentional action at the border. Our 
observations of Handhold provide greater texture and granularity to the exact moment of the sov-
ereign decision to permit or exclude, and as such foreground how that decision is constituted by 
multiple temporalities and enacted by an assemblage of human actors and non-human materials 
(e.g. technologies; substances; data) at multiple sites. While opening up that moment of decision 
enables us to trace the force of sovereign power back into laboratory spaces, what needs further 
explanation is how that moment is also powerfully constituted by future-oriented fantasies, imagi-
nations, and assumptions.
Imagining the border: Phantoms, assemblages, and decisions
Engineer [describing an early observation of border practices at a European port]: At six in the morning on 
a cold, spring, dark morning watching the dawn come up you realize just, you know, how this device has 
got to work. Because they had beautiful big dogs … just placidly sitting there wagging their tails … they 
[customs officials] made the people walk through into the reception area of the port. The dog just goes 
forward, just ever so gently on, on the leg – just brushes up against him, and you realize that you’ve got to 
design a box of electronics that not only is as good as the dog but interacts with people in a way, because 
no box of electronics is going to have that kind of general interaction. (Handhold, 2014a)
We have revealed thus far that the scientific practices of bordering within the laboratory are framed 
by competing interpretations of the purpose of the project (e.g. between end-users and scientists), 
and by the competing temporalities of the instruments and the substances under scrutiny. A final 
dimension that disrupts the secluded nature of Translation 2 is how particular actors are re-enrolled 
into the assemblage; more specifically, how the practices of actually-present human actors within 
the laboratory are governed by the capacities, needs, and desires of particular phantom agents: the 
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sniffer dog, and the border guard. This suggests that the assemblages constituting Handhold are not 
simply comprised of human and non-human/technical nodes, but also that the actors are simultane-
ously actually present and immanent in the form of phantoms. Moreover, the enrolment of phan-
tasmic actors into the assemblage further relocates the sovereign decisions of risk assessment and 
management away from the border and border guards, and into the laboratory itself.
The founding phantoms of Handhold are the sniffer dogs that the device is designed to replace, 
or at least to complement, as they form the baseline against which all functionality is to be com-
pared. This canine spectre haunted Handhold’s multiple and sometimes competing interpretations 
of the EU’s desires for CBRNE detection. When asked about the purpose of Handhold in general, 
almost all participants were clear that whatever device was developed, it had to do more than a 
sniffer dog could do, and do it better and more efficiently. The project partners were clear in their 
preference for techno-science over canine detection: dogs get bored after 20 minutes of detection 
work, whereas security devices can go for as long as their batteries let them; the labour intensive 
and costly training period for a single sniffer dog is replaced by a one-off training session for large 
numbers of security agents; and while a dog can be trained to detect one or two substances, a port-
able device can detect multiple substances at once. The sniffer dog came to operate as both an 
aspiration and a regulatory ideal as scientists and engineers continually gauged their progress 
through constant comparison between the Handhold device and the dog. For example, one of the 
Handhold partners discovered that dogs can detect substances at one part per billion rather than 
many parts per million, and this quickly became the agreed target (Handhold, 2013i). Moreover, 
during the prototype testing as the scientists and engineers asked end-users and EU representatives 
whether they wanted more or less sensitivity with regards to a particular sensor, the criteria for 
judgement was whether this was close to what a dog could detect (Handhold, 2014d). At many 
points throughout Handhold’s development, the device’s ability to detect more substances and last 
for longer than the sniffer dog energized scientists and engineers, and gave the project momentum 
(Handhold, 2013f, 2013i, 2013j, 2013l, 2014d, 2014e). It became clear that Handhold partners did 
not develop a unified sense of their progress with reference to the EU’s remit of CBRNE, but rather 
charted their success with reference to a widely shared imagination of the capabilities and behav-
iours of the sniffer dog.
While the omnipresent sniffer dog stands as a key comparator for the device, the most palpable 
phantom in the laboratory with regard to its form and composition is the border guard, or primary 
‘user’. The imagined needs, desires, and habits of these individuals are constantly invoked in the 
laboratory in ways that have concrete impacts on the design of the device itself. As a partner in the 
consortium, Handhold’s end-user group is used nominally to ensure that the work of the project is 
‘grounded in and therefore valuable to the practical day-to-day realities of detection’ (Handhold, 
2013j). While sometimes physically present as an end-user representative, the phantom border 
guard emerges most frequently within the imaginations of scientists and engineers as their assump-
tions about the ‘day-to-day realities of detection’ shape the material composition of the device. 
These imaginations range in complexity, but are often expressed with reference to the mundane 
materiality of the device itself. Throughout our research we encountered highly sophisticated and 
intense conversations about, for example, the ease and frequency of battery changes, the size and 
weight of the actual device, and the physical placement of screens, read-outs, and power sources 
(Handhold, 2013f, 2013l). We saw very clearly how the ‘real world’ of an imagined border popu-
lated by multiple border guards (Translation 3) loops back through Translation 2 and is inscribed 
directly into the device in a way that ‘scripts’ future bordering practices (Akrich, 1992).
The ‘end-user’ continually disrupts any unidirectional understanding of translation by introduc-
ing questions about the actual physical use of the device on a daily basis. While these questions 
involve future-oriented and speculative scenarios, they are no less real in terms of their impact on 
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the design and development of the device. Scientists and engineers were constantly trying to ensure 
that the device was robust enough to avoid catastrophic breakage when, for example, it was ‘tossed 
onto a desk’ by an imagined border guard, or tilted the wrong way in an effort to reach difficult or 
enclosed spaces (this latter speculation produced a demand for tilt alarms to avoid spillage within 
the device’s liquid interfaces) (Handhold, 2013f, 2013l). While the device was adapted to accom-
modate the ‘rough’ and ‘careless’ behaviour of imagined border guards, its user interface was also 
adapted in response to the environmental conditions in which bordering takes place. If the device 
is to be used outside in inclement weather, including rain or cold, it was observed that the guards 
would wish to keep their gloves on (Handhold, 2013f, 2013l). The original plan for a touch-screen 
device, therefore, was discarded, as it cannot be used by gloved fingers. Moreover, the need for a 
wireless connection to a smart phone application, also part of the initial plan, was also revisited 
when its actual utility for guards was questioned. In these ways, phantom end-users were powerful 
in shaping the actual form, design and components of the device itself. To be sure, each of these 
scenarios of future use by border guards was an exercise in imagination that required mental con-
structions of a ‘typical’ user and a ‘typical’ scenario, but the effects of these constructions were 
both real and determinative of decision-making.
The complexity of that force emerged in the efforts to make Handhold a truly international bor-
dering device that can operate in multi-jurisdictional and multi-state scenarios. There are different 
detection means and procedures across Europe, and the challenge for security actors is to accom-
modate different practices, standards, and equipment (NATO, 2007). Within Handhold, these 
accommodations were revealed in partner efforts to create a common language to understand the 
results produced by the device in multiple countries, borders, and professions. Once again, imag-
ined border guards loomed large, especially their capacity to accomplish technical tasks: Should 
results be presented in pictorial, graph or number form? Should alarms be accompanied by sound 
or flashing lights, depending on the severity and immediacy of presumed danger (Handhold, 2013f, 
2013l, 2014d, 2014e)? These anticipations about the skill-sets and capacities of border guards 
range from questions about their basic ability to use such a device through to more specialized 
trouble-shooting and problem solving (Handhold, 2014d, 2014e). For example, if the system needs 
to be flushed and cleaned, how can this be as simple and non-technical as possible, and also port-
able so it can occur regularly outside of the sterile and equipped environment of the laboratory, in 
order that border guards themselves are able to accomplish such mundane tasks (Handhold, 2013f, 
2014d, 2014e)? Here, too, the environmental and atmospheric context of use is crucial: influences 
such as background radiation have to be measured and accommodated for in order to set the 
parameters for false positives and accurate readings (Handhold, 2014d), and accounting for such 
interference should also be as non-technical and straightforward as possible.
Enrolling the phantom border guard in the development of Handhold is a process of laboratizing 
the border – of placing a replica of the laboratory at the border itself. This introduces difficult ques-
tions about the autonomy of the device itself in relation to who makes the decision (i.e. the increas-
ingly autonomous device or the fallible and phantasmic border guard) and where the decision is 
taken (i.e. at the border when the device is in use, or in the laboratory when scientists and engineers 
are adapting the device). When we are attentive to excesses of Translation 2 – how the laboratory 
is constituted by imagined actors and future scenarios – we see that solutions become most appar-
ent when decisions are removed from the human border guard and located in the increased auton-
omy of the device. Central, here, is the adaptability of the device – its ability to accommodate the 
needs and desires of the guards using it regardless of where they are located, or how much specific 
technical knowledge they may have. Increasing the autonomy of the device means reducing, as far 
as possible, the role of the border guard by automating and miniaturizing the laboratories of 
Translation 2 and extending them to the border in a way that pre-emptively captures – and 
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laboratizes – the space of Translation 3. This capture does not determine usage or appropriation of 
the product (as discussed in the introduction to this special issue); it does not remove the discretion 
of border guards who may ignore a reading, act in ways other than what the reading might suggest, 
damage the device, or reject the product altogether. Rather, it reveals how Translation 2 extends 
itself into the future by anticipating and adapting to usage and appropriation via the quite unscien-
tific means of bringing it into the laboratory through imagined phantoms and scenarios.
A great deal of bordering and laboratizing is (at the time of writing) still ongoing within the 
dispersed Handhold collective. The assemblage that comprises the scientist-device-guard spans 
geographical space, but nevertheless exists in a tight network that is mediated by the device itself. 
Our point is not that there will be no decisions left to be made at the border, but rather that those 
decisions are configured (informed, sped up, and constrained or enabled) as the conditions of the 
laboratory are built into the device in advance of its deployment at the border. This suggests that 
disaggregated sovereign decisions are enacted much further back in the process of research and 
development than initially understood. With respect to Handhold, our point is that every decision 
on the way to producing a coherent little blue box that informs and inscribes bordering actions has 
within it aspects of sovereign power.
Conclusions
Our analysis of Handhold seeks to contribute to ongoing debates about the complex relations 
between scientific research and political life in the area of security. Further, we want to intervene 
in critical border studies research with the claim that we cannot fully understand – and therefore 
question or resist – the operation of security technologies at the border without understanding how 
such devices were funded, designed, crafted, adapted, and tested before being deployed. Security 
is not simply governed at the moment of border crossing, at the site of the border itself, or in the 
moment of encounter between security agents and travellers; rather, sovereign decisions about 
who/what can enter and who/what cannot enter are constituted long before security devices are 
purchased by governments and used by customs agents and border guards.
Callon et al. write that the difference between the before and after of ‘science’ is the sudden 
proliferation of laboratories along with techniques and entities they mobilize and ‘the interests and 
projects they authorize’ (2001: 66). As we have shown, Handhold illustrates how these interests 
and projects are authorized in the laboratory during the work of ‘making silent entities speak’ 
(Callon et al., 2001: 54). We have seen how the silent entities of CBRNE substances are made to 
speak first in the Handhold laboratories so that those laboratories can be rendered stable, portable, 
accurate, robust, and fast, and transported to future borders where they can act as one. Handhold is 
about making CBRNE substances speak to border guards and enrolling funders, scientists, and 
engineers into the project of calibrating what these substances say and how they say it. In this way, 
the voices of CBRNE substances become an active part of the rituals of bordering – as lively, 
present, and animated as the human agents who cross and patrol them (Salter, 2012).
It is within Handhold’s seemingly secluded assembling of imaginations, materials, and phan-
toms that a future border security is materialized. To adopt Pickering’s metaphor of choreography, 
many human and non-human and material and immaterial ‘plural forces of authorization’ (Amoore, 
2013: 14–15) dance with each other as Handhold brings science and security together. Developing 
the Handhold device does not present a linear process of Callon et al.’s three translations, but 
instead a sense of emergence, non-linear resonance, endless circulation, and unexpected redirec-
tion. It shows an ‘uncertain world’ (Callon et al., 2001) in which scientists and engineers produce 
an equivalence between the tangible worlds of explosives, narcotics, and radiation, and the intan-
gible worlds of phantoms, imaginations, and future scenarios. The decision of the border – the 
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sovereign capacity to identify, control, and manage – takes place here prior to any encounter 
between the device/dog/border guard and the flow of packages, containers, and people. In this 
way, sovereign bordering takes place in the laboratory, before the laboratory takes its place at the 
sovereign border.
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Notes
1. While the European Commission funding call included CBRNE amongst other targets, CBRNE are pre-
dominant in the early framing of Handhold and prominent in many other projects funded under the same 
call (such as the SNIFFLES and SNIFFER projects).
2. We are not suggesting here that university researchers are not attuned to market pressures; indeed, many 
university departments are explicit about commercializing their research and often employ dedicated 
professionals whose job it is to transform ‘blue skies’ and ‘ivory-tower’ research into patents, products, 
and profit.
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